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1.  Introduction 
This paper discusses innovative methods of spatial analysis to indentify local 
patterns of competition between secondary schools within London. It shows that 
higher and lower attaining pupils at primary school separate from each other as 
they make the transition into secondary schools. This process of separation is 
found for every year from 2003 to 2008 but without evidence that it is either 
worsening or improving. 
This  continuity  matches  the  conclusion  of  Gibbons  &  Telhaj  (2007)  who 
found, for London as well as for the rest of England, that almost nothing changed 
during the (preceding) period from 1996 to 2002 in terms of the way pupils of 
differing age-11 ability are sorted into different secondary schools. They reached 
this conclusion by using Pupil Level Annual School Census (PLASC) / National 
Pupil Database (NPD) data that provide information on individual pupils within 
state  schools  in  England,  including  their  attainment  level  in  compulsory  and 
standardised  testing  prior  to  leaving  primary  school  aged  11.  Since  the  data 
show which primary school the pupil has attended and also which secondary 
school they are attending or will attend, so it is possible to look at whether each 
secondary is recruiting higher or lower attaining pupils.  Gibbons and Telhaj do 
this by graphing the cumulative distribution of pupil ability across school intakes 
and by decomposing pupil variance of ability both between schools and within 
schools. 
Burgess et al. (2008) also use PLASC/NPD data, in their case to show that, in 
2004  and  in  England,  high  ability  pupils  are  more  likely  to  go  to  the  modal 
secondary  school  for  their  primary  school  cohort  if  that  secondary  school  is   2 
better than average in terms of its pupil’s attainment, with the reverse being true 
for lower ability pupils. They also show that “poor pupils”, as defined by free 
school meal eligibility, are less likely to go to the modal secondary school when it 
is better than average but more likely to go when it is worse. In other words, 
there is a bifurcation of higher and lower attaining pupils and, not uncorrelated, 
of richer and poorer ones in the transition from primary to secondary school. 
This paper differs from these previous studies in two important ways. First, 
explicit consideration is given to determining which schools compete with which 
others, then incorporating that information within the modelling process. The 
importance  of  linking  measures  of  separation,  or  of  segregation,  to  the  local 
markets within which schools operate is stressed by Harris & Johnston (2008), 
after Gibson & Asthana (2000), the latter authors noting: “in trying to establish 
whether or not the marketization of education has had a polarizing effect, the 
unit of analysis must […] be the local market within which schools (and parents 
faced with placement decisions) actually operate” (p. 139). 
Put another way, when measuring whether facets of the education system 
cause  some  groups  of  pupils  to  be  found  in  some  schools  but  not  in  others, 
consideration must be given to the spatial properties of markets, choice and of 
competition. It is not sufficient to assume, tacitly or otherwise, that schools are 
competing with each other within a local education authority. Though there has 
been  much  discussion  on  the  virtues  or  otherwise  of  various  indices  of 
separation/segregation/polarization (see, for example, Allen & Vignoles 2007; 
Gibson  &  Asthana  2003;  Goldstein  &  Noden  2003;  Goldstein  &  2004;  Gorard 
2000; Gorard 2004; Gorard 2007; Johnston & Jones 2010; Poulsen et al. 2001;   3 
Peach 2009), less attention has been paid to the areal units of analysis (but see 
Harris & Johnston 2003; Shuttleworth et al. 2011). 
The second difference is to adopt a spatial analytical perspective. Specifically, 
knowledge of which schools are competing with each other is formalised as a 
weights  matrix  in  a  spatial  regression  model.  In  part  this  has  technical 
advantages:  it  helps  avoid  the  under-estimation  of  the  standard  errors  in  a 
regression model that occurs if spatial dependencies exist but are not allowed 
for. However, the primary motivation is substantive. The approach allows the 
amount of separation of higher and lower attaining pupils to be quantified as a 
measure of spatial autocorrelation for which a significance measure can also be 
determined. Whereas most indices of separation/segregation are aspatial (but 
see Johnston et al. 2011; Lloyd, in press) the same is not true of the methods 
used here. 
Throughout  the  paper  the  term  separation  is  generally  preferred  over 
another commonly used word, segregation. Though the two can be synonyms, 
the latter often acquires a pejorative interpretation when it is taken to imply that 
two or more groups of people are actively avoiding each other and/or are being 
kept  apart  due  to  some  underlying  structural  properties  of,  in  this  case,  the 
education system. In addition, the language of segregation tends to presume that 
separations – by race, by wealth, by attainment – are necessarily undesirable 
even though cogent arguments sometimes can be made to the contrary (Merry 
2011). From a libertarian and, arguably, a social justice point of view (Brighouse 
2002) the key issue is whether the separations are voluntary or not. Though no 
definitive answer is possible from this type of study, the evident stability in the   4 
degree of separation of higher and lower attaining pupils in London over the 
period from 2003 to 2008 (and 1996 to 2002 in Gibbons’ and Telhaj’s study) 
suggests there are strong social and geographical constraints impacting upon 
school  choices  that  enforce  and  reinforce  the  geographies  of  transition,  and 
which recent educational reforms have done little to change. 
 
2.  Geographies of transition 
The PLASC/NPD dataset used for this study is comprised of 376 577 records 
of pupils who made the transition from a primary to secondary school in London 
during any of the years from 2003 to 2008. After some cleaning of the data, 
primarily  to  omit  missing  records  but  also  pupils  with  exceptionally  low 
attainment scores (in the lowest 0.5 per cent, that might otherwise skew the 
analysis), 365 917 records remain (97 per cent). The number of pupils and of 
schools per year are recorded in Table 1 together with the mean attainment and 
standard deviation of the pupils in the standardised tests taken during their final 
year of primary school (Key Stage 2). 
 










2003  59922  383  27.4  4.28 
2004  60861  381  27.4  4.34 
2005  61816  381  27.5  4.30 
2006  62325  382  27.6  4.39 
2007  59758  373  27.8  4.29 
2008  61235  367  27.8  4.05 
   5 
Table 1. The numbers of pupils and schools in the data set for each of the years 
from  2003  to  2008,  and  the  mean  attainment  and  standard  deviation  of  the 
pupils’ standardised test scores. 
 
The geography of transition is shown in Figure 1 for the year 2008. Taking 
each secondary school in turn, the primary schools are ranked in order of the 
proportion of the secondary school’s intake they send that year. In this way and 
by considering only the first 80 per cent per secondary school, primary schools 
sending few pupils to the secondary are discarded. Following Burgess et al. (op. 
cit.) the map is topological: the connections between the secondary and feeder 
primary schools are correct but the geographical locations are not. This helps 
preserve the anonymity of individual schools. 
   6 
Figure 1. Showing the links between primary and secondary schools for the first 
80% of the intake into each secondary school in London in 2008. The average 
secondary school receives four-fifths of its intake from 15-16 feeder primary 
schools. 
 
The number associated with each secondary school is the amount of feeder 
primary  schools  it  links  to.  Across  London,  the  mean  and  median  average 
number of primary schools per secondary school is 16 and 15, respectively, with 
an interquartile range from 9 to 23 and an entire range from 3 to 61 schools. 
Burgess et al. find that there is an average of 37 primary schools per secondary 
school and a near identical value is found here, too, if all the pupils into every 
secondary school are considered. However, that is to exaggerate the complexity 
of the system and includes what might reasonably be regarded as exceptional 
cases. If, instead, only the first half of the intake into each secondary school is 
considered,  more  distinct  geographical  patterns  become  apparent  (Figure  2). 
That they do is not surprising. Although only one quarter of pupils in London go 
to their nearest secondary school it does not follow they are travelling far: on 
average a secondary school in London has seventeen others within a ten-minute 
drive from it (Burgess et al. 2006).   7 
 
Figure 2. Showing the links between primary and secondary schools for the first 
50% of the intake into each secondary school. 
 
Sutherland et al. (2010) indentify the uneasy tension between the promotion 
of  school  choice  and  the  priority  given  to  locally  based  partnership  working 
between schools and other children’s services both in the delivery of extended 
services (for example, after-school clubs) and in aiding the ease of transition 
from primary to secondary school for more vulnerable and less confident pupils 
especially  (cf.  DCSF  2008;  DCSF  2009).  Recognising  the  community  role  of 
schools,  a  general  preference  for  ease  of  access  and  local  schooling,  and  the 
impacts of geographically admissions criteria constraining the choice set, it is not 
surprising if many pupils attend a relatively local school (Harris 2011).   8 
Figure 3 summarises what a comparison of Figures 1 and 2 will  show: a 
typical  secondary  school  recruits  the  majority  of  its  pupils  from  a  relatively 
smaller  number  of  primary  schools  (average,  six)  but  that  number  rises 
exponentially as an increasingly greater proportion of the pupils is considered. 
Not surprisingly, the average transition distance rises too. For 50 per cent of the 
intake, the median distance between a secondary school and its feeder primary 
schools is 1.4km, for 80 per cent it is 2.0km, and for the complete intake it is 
3.1km. The data are for 2008 but the same trends are observed for other years in 
the data. 
   9 
Figure  3.  Showing the typical number of feeder primary schools a  secondary 
school in London in 2008 has for a certain percentage of its intake. For example, 
the median average for the entire intake is 38 but can be higher than 60 or lower 
than 22 for some schools. 
 
It is instructive to look at the composition of secondary schools that have the 
most and least numbers of feeder primary schools, most and least being defined 
by secondary schools in the upper or lower quartile respectively at the 80 per 
cent threshold of Figure 3. 
Table  2  gives  indices  showing  those  characteristics  of  pupils  making  the 
transition  from  primary  to  secondary  school  in  London  in  2008  that 
disproportionally are found  in  the  schools  with most  or least  feeder  schools, 
relative to all others. An index value of 100 indicates parity. It is notable that 
schools  selecting  by  academic  attainment  are  disproportionately  over-
represented by a factor of 25 amongst schools with the highest number of feeder 
primary schools. Voluntary-aided Church of England (CoE) and Roman Catholic 
(RC) schools also are over-represented, as are Black Caribbean and Black African 
pupils.  Voluntary-aided  (VA)  schools  have  greater  latitude  to  set  their  own 
admissions  criteria  than  voluntary-controlled  faith  schools,  and  these  criteria 
may include demonstrated commitment to the faith group. 
At  the  other  extreme,  secondaries  with  few  feeder  primaries  are 
disproportionately likely to contain higher proportions of Indian and Pakistani 
pupils,  and  to  be  one  of  another  type  of  faith  school  (Jewish,  Seventh  Day 
Adventist, Sikh or other Christian). 
   10 






Proportion of pupils eligible for free school meals 
(FSM) (n = 16269)  81  79 
Proportion of pupils for whom English is second 
language (n = 21250)  84  87 
Proportion of pupils with a certified statement of 
special educational needs (SEN) (n = 1286)  73  102 
Proportion of pupils White (n = 28668)  90  144 
Proportion of pupils Black Caribbean (n = 3925)  148  45 
Proportion of pupils Black African (n = 7154)  141  63 
Proportion of pupils Indian (n = 3249)  59  181 
Proportion of pupils Pakistani (n = 2393)  52  187 
Proportion of pupils Bangladeshi (n = 3339)  50  43 
Proportion of pupils Chinese (n = 388)  250  57 
Voluntary aided (CoE) school (n = 25)  442  0 
Voluntary aided (RC) school (n = 63)  158  61 
Voluntary controlled school (n = 5)  74  0 
Other faith school (n = 7)  49  556 
Selective school (n = 19)  2504  0 
Smaller school*
3
 (n = 120)  147  64 
 
*
1 The index shows whether the proportion of, for example, FSM pupils, attending 
secondary schools with the highest number of feeder schools is the same as it is 
for all other schools. A value of 100 is parity; 200 indicates the proportion is 
double (FSM pupils are over-represented); 50 indicates it is half. 
*
2 As above but comparing schools with the lowest number of feeder schools with 
all others. 
*
3 The number of pupils enrolled in 2008 is in the lower third for all schools in the 
study region 
 
Table 2. Indices indicating the characteristics of pupils or of schools that are 
over-  or  under-represented  in  schools  with  high  or  low  number  of  feeder 
schools, relative to all others. An index value of 100 is parity. 
 
3.  Comparing each secondary school with its competitors 
To  understand  the  logic  of  the  analysis  that  follows,  consider  a  situation 
where  all  pupils  achieved  exactly  the  same  standardised  test  result  prior  to 
leaving primary school. Averaging those test results by the secondary schools the 
pupils attend subsequently would produce no differences: each of the secondary   11 
schools would yield the same prior attainment average for its group of incoming 
pupils. 
Now imagine that the differences between the pupils were random and the 
pupils were randomly allocated from a primary school to a secondary school. In 
this case the differences between the secondary schools would be random also. 
Finally, consider the true case: the attainment scores are not all equal; there 
is,  for  example,  a  correlation  between  eligibility  for  a  free  school  meal  and 
attainment (FSM eligible pupils are lower attaining on average than those not 
eligible: 26.4 Vs 28.4: t = -52.5, df = 27040, p < 0.001). There also appears to be at 
least some geographical patterning to the transition from primary to secondary 
schools.  In  such  circumstances,  non-random  differences  in  the  mean  prior 
attainment scores by secondary school are to be expected. 
Those differences exhibit a geography that can be summarised by a Moran 
plot,  Figure  4.  Here  it  compares  the  mean  prior  attainment  scores  of  pupils 
entering  a  secondary  school  in  London  in  2008  (horizontal  axis)  with  the 
spatially lagged and weighted mean of locally competing schools (vertical axis). 
That the line of best fit, the regression line, is upward sloping reveals positive 
spatial  autocorrelation:  secondary  schools  that  receive  the  highest  prior 
attaining students tend to be competing with other schools that receive the same 
and,  reciprocally,  schools  that  receive  the  lower  attaining  pupils  are  also 
competing with schools that receive the same. 
Again, there are no surprises here. Indicative of neighbourhood inequalities, 
the  positive  autocorrelation  has little  to  do with the  sorting of  high and low 
attaining pupils from each other in the transition  from primary to secondary   12 
school but is a function of geography, specifically social geographies, the links 
between social privilege and educational attainment, and of the geography of 




Figure 4. A Moran plot comparing the mean prior attainment of pupils entering a 
secondary school in London in 2008 with the mean of that school’s competitors. 
The values indicated on the axis are the minimum, first quartile, second quintile, 
median, third quintile, third quartile and the maximum.   13 
 
The  point  that  follows  but  often  is  missed  with  simple  measures  of 
segregation is that any separation of low and high attaining pupils needs to be 
disentangled from the socio-economic and residential geographies that provide 
the canvas on which the effects of school choice and selection are painted. Here it 
is  achieved by changing the  focus from the  mean prior  attainment score  per 
secondary  school  to  considering,  instead,  the  difference  between  the  prior 
attainment school per school and that of its neighbours. This is a simple local 
measure of dissimilarity, calculated as 
   
d  xi  wijxj j1
n1  j  i,0  wij 1, wij 1
j1
n1   
      [1]
 
where d is the measure of local dissimilarity, i is a secondary school, j is any 
other secondary school in the study region, n is the total number of schools and 
wij is a row-standardised weights matrix where any value above 0 indicates i and 
j  are  competing.  A  negative  value  of  d  indicates  a  school  is  recruiting  lower 
attaining  pupils  on  average  and  relative  to  its  competitors.  A  positive  value 
indicates it is recruiting higher attaining pupils. 
The definition of competing schools arises from Figure 1. As well as a map, it 
is a graph where any two secondary schools can be linked by a shared primary 
school; that is, where they recruit from one or more of the same primary schools. 
As a definition, that requires the schools to recruit only one pupil each from the 
shared primary school for the secondary schools to regarded as competing. In 
practice, the weight of competition considers how important the primary school 
is to each secondary school in terms of the share of the intake drawn from it.   14 
Specifically, the weight is equal to the proportion of secondary school i’s intake 
that is drawn from the primary school, multiplied by the proportion of secondary 
school j’s intake that is drawn from the same, then scaled (row-standardised) so 
that the sum of the weights for any schools is equal to one. 
If the value of d for each secondary school is now compared with that of its 
competitors, evidence of significant negative spatial autocorrelation is found – 
Figure 5. A null hypothesis that the downward sloping regression line actually is 
flat (meaning no spatial autocorrelation) can be rejected at a greater than 99.9 
per cent confidence. 
Consider the 82 schools in sector 1 of the graph (bounded on two sides by 
the dashed lines). Put simply, these are schools that are losing out in the local 
competition  for  pupils.  The  pupils  they  enrol  have  lower  average  attainment 
than would be expected given the schools they compete with, and they are in the 
lowest fifth for the distribution of d scores. Furthermore, competing schools are 
recruiting higher attaining pupils, on average, placing the spatially lagged value 
in the highest fifth for those scores. 
In contrast, the 85 schools in sector III gain the higher attaining pupils at the 
expense  of  their  competitors.  Sector  II  contains  schools  that  attract  higher 
attaining  pupils  on  average,  as  do  their  competitors,  whereas  Sector  IV  has 
schools and competitors that attract the lower attaining pupils.   15 
 
Figure  5.  Moran  plot  comparing  the  measure  of  dissimilarity,  d,  for  each 
secondary school with the average for its competitors. The downward sloping 
regression line is evidence of negative spatial autocorrelation – of the separation 
of higher and lower attaining pupils in the transition from primary to secondary 
school. 
 
Table 3 summarises the characteristics of schools in each of the four sectors 
using  the  index  method  described  in  Section  2  for  Table  2  but  this  time 
comparing the schools in one sector with the schools in the remaining three. It is 
notable that the schools that “lose out” (in sector I of Figure 5, index value I in   16 
Table 3) contain a disproportionate number of pupils with a certified statement 
of  educational  needs,  and  also  a  high  proportion  of  white  pupils,  whereas 
“gainers” (sector III; index value III) tend to contain a higher proportion of non-
white  pupils.  The  exceptions  are  Indian  and  Chinese  pupils  that 
disproportionately  are  found  in  sector  II  schools:  schools  that  recruit  higher 
attaining pupils, on average, and compete with other schools that do the same. 
Selective schools overwhelmingly are found in this group. Finally, in sector IV – 
schools that recruit pupils of lower than the locally expected average attainment 
and compete with schools that do the same – there is a higher proportion of free 
school  meal  eligible  pupils  and  also  a  disproportionate  number  of  Black 


















Proportion of pupils eligible for free school meals 
(FSM)  113  57  97  132 
Proportion of pupils for whom English is second 
language  106  84  107  93 
Proportion of pupils with a certified statement of 
special educational needs (SEN)  127  96  76  107 
Proportion of pupils White  105  101  89  111 
Proportion of pupils Black Caribbean  93  82  113  111 
Proportion of pupils Black African  97  88  103  113 
Proportion of pupils Indian  91  100  154  40 
Proportion of pupils Pakistani  92  59  157  74 
Proportion of pupils Bangladeshi  128  99  121  28 
Proportion of pupils Chinese  52  268  97  71 
Voluntary aided (CoE) school  59  382  56  78 
Voluntary aided (RC) school  91  223  74  62 
Voluntary controlled school  0  0  -  0 
Other faith school  48  136  121  146 
Selective school  0  764  129  0 
Smaller school  87  171  52  168   17 
Table 3. Indices indicating the characteristics of pupils and of schools in each of 
the sectors I to IV, respectively, in Figure 5, relative to the other sectors. 
 
4.  Spatial model of separation 
To formalise and to assess the significance of the various indicators of lower 
and higher prior attainment averaged by secondary school, a spatial regression 
model is used. Specifically, a spatial lagged y model (also known as the spatial 
autoregressive model) is used of the form: 
     yi  xi wi.yi i              [2] 
where, following the notation of  Ward & Gleditsch (2008), x is a vector of 
predictor variables,  are the regression coefficients, wi is the weights matrix 
defining competing schools, i is an error term, and yi is the measure of local 
dissimilarity (d) measuring whether a school recruits higher or lower attaining 
pupils, on average, relative to its local competitors. Of particular interest is the 
measure of spatial autocorrelation,  (rho), which quantifies the dependency of 
the measured yi at one school on the value of y measured at its competitors. It 
summarises the average dissimilarity between a school and its competitors in 
regard to the mean prior attainment of their intakes. 
The  form  of  the  model  is  drawn from  the  spatial  econometrics  literature 
where it is used to measure spatial spillover effects (LeSage and Pace 2008). It is 
fitted in the statistical and computing software, R, with the spatial dependency 
(spdep)  library,  and  using  an  optimisation  and  generalised  least  squares 
procedure. Whereas the y values are calculated from the PLASC/NPD data for 
pupils making the transition from primary to secondary school in 2008, the x   18 
values  omit  that  year  and  are  calculated  from  the  pupil  data  for  each  of  the 
remaining years 2003–7. 
The  results  are  shown  in  Table  4  where  significant  indicators  of  prior 
attainment  averaged  by  secondary  school  are  identified  at  a  95%  confidence 
level or above. All the variables have been standardised – converted to z-values – 
to  permit  comparison  of  the  magnitude  of  their  effects.  Not  surprisingly, 
selective  schools  admit  the  highest  attaining  pupils  even  given  the  local 
competition,  and  voluntary-aided  CoE  and  RC  schools,  though  not  directly 
selective by attainment, also recruit the more academically able students locally. 
There is evidence that Chinese students are higher attaining and they are: the 
difference between their mean standardised test score (29.9) and the mean for 
other pupils (27.8) is adjudged significant by a two-sample t-test: t = 11.2, df = 
392.9, p < 0.001. Smaller schools recruit the lower attaining pupils. 
Of particular note is that the rho value is both significant and of sizable effect. 
This is again evidence of significant separation by attainment as pupils make the 
transition from primary to secondary school. The Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) is a goodness-of-fit measure where the lower it is, the better. Comparing 
the AIC value for the spatially lagged model it is found to fit the data better than a 
standard regression model that omits the effects of spatial dependency. 
 
Standardised Indicator   
ö    s.e.  z
  p   
(intercept)  -0.077  0.048  -1.599  0.110   
Proportion of pupils eligible for free school 
meals (FSM)  -0.220  0.059  -3.719  <0.001  * 
Proportion of pupils for whom English is 
second language  -0.023  0.075  -0.311  0.756   
Proportion of pupils with a certified statement  -0.058  0.035  -1.671  0.095     19 
of special educational needs (SEN) 
Proportion of pupils White  -0.144  0.099  -1.445  0.148   
Proportion of pupils Black Caribbean  0.065  0.053  1.206  0.228   
Proportion of pupils Black African  -0.103  0.057  -1.807  0.071   
Proportion of pupils Indian  0.014  0.055  0.253  0.801   
Proportion of pupils Pakistani  -0.030  0.047  -0.647  0.518   
Proportion of pupils Bangladeshi  0.098  0.056  1.754  0.080   
Proportion of pupils Chinese  0.119  0.042  2.827  0.005  * 
Voluntary aided (CoE) school  0.448  0.151  2.959  0.003  * 
Voluntary aided (RC) school  0.236  0.117  2.016  0.044  * 
Voluntary controlled school  -0.008  0.287  -0.029  0.977   
Other faith school  0.449  0.259  1.730  0.084   
Selective school  2.208  0.218  10.116  <0.001  * 
Smaller school  -0.170  0.079  -2.144  0.032  * 
Rho  -0.705  0.060  -11.829  <0.001  * 
AIC  773  (AIC for linear model: 857) 
LM test for residual autocorrelation  77  p-value: <0.001 
Table 4. Summary statistics for the spatially lagged y model. An asterisk indicates 
significance at a 95% confidence interval or above. 
 
Turning to the foot of Table 4, the Langrange Multiplier (LM) test reveals that 
significant residual autocorrelation remains unexplained in the data. Evidence 
that this is caused by selective and by voluntary-aided faith schools is presented 
under the column header 2008 in Table 5. Although the residual autocorrelation 
remains significant at a 95 per cent confidence interval or above when either the 
selective or faith schools are omitted, when all are it is no longer so. The same is 
true for all but two of the years from 2003 to 2008. 
 
  Ye
ar  2008  2007  2006  2005  2004  2003 
All schools 















C   773  800  856  809  803  826 





























C  831  833  877  853  847  883 











*  0.072 
Omitting voluntary-aided (VA) 
schools 
















568  601  639  616  595  629 














Omitting selective and VA 
schools 
























0.193  0.161 
Table  5.  Summarising  the  amount  of  explained  and  unexplained  spatial 
dependency found in each of the models with d as the dependent variable and for 
each of the years 2003-8.  
 
Returning to the observed rho value, Table 5 shows it to be significant for all 
but one of the models fitted to the data for each of the years from 2003 to 2008. 
The exception is the model for 2008 where the selective and voluntary-aided 
schools are omitted and where the decrease in the magnitude of rho is much 
greater than for other years. It is not entirely clear why this has occurred, though 
the decrease in the number of secondary schools falling into these categories 
should be noted: between 2003 and 2006 there were 274 or 275 in this group; 
266 in 2007 and 260 in 2008. 
That the rho value otherwise is significant indicates a significant separation 
of lower and higher attaining pupils in the transition from primary to secondary   21 
schools that persists throughout the period from 2003 to 2008 yet also appears 
neither to be increase nor decreasing. Indeed, such changes as there are appear 
to be related to a combination of demographic factors and the opening or closure 
of  schools.  The  Spearman’s  rank  correlation  between  the  rho  value  (for  all 
schools) and the number of pupils in each year is rS = 0.464. The correlation 
between  the  rho  value  and  the  total  number  of  schools  is  rS  =  0.632.  These 
correlations suggest that as the number of pupils competing for places increases 
so the separation of lower and higher attaining ones tends to decrease, possibly 
because it forces a greater spread of pupils across more schools that are not 
necessarily their first choice. They also suggest that as the number of schools 
decreases  so  the  amount  of  separation  increases,  possibly  because  the 
competition of places in popular schools intensifies. However, in both cases the 
suggestions are largely conjecture. 
In fact, looking at the change in the dissimilarity (d) values from the year 
2003 to 2008 and comparing that change to the value of d in 2003, what appears 
most evident is regression to the mean: schools that were more dissimilar to 
their competitors in 2003 tended to become less so by 2008, and schools that 
were less dissimilar in 2003 tended to become more so. 
There are, of course exceptions and it may be observed that amongst those 
schools that had greater dissimilarity from their competitors in 2008 and for 
which  that  dissimilarity  increased  by  2008  (sector  II  of  Figure  6),  selective 
schools are disproportionately over-represented, as are, but to a much lesser 
extent, Roman Catholic VA schools – see Table 6 (index II). However, it is too 
simplistic  to  suggest  that  selective  and  faith  schools  increasingly  attract  the   22 
higher attaining pupils. In fact, there also is a disproportionate number of such 
schools amongst the group who were dissimilar to their competitors but are 
becoming more like them (sector III, Figure 6; Index III, Table 6). 
Amongst those schools that “lost out” in 2003 and do but more so in 2008, 
there  is  a  disproportionate  number  of  white  pupils  (sector  IV;  index  IV). 
Encouragingly,  perhaps,  FSM  eligible  pupils  disproportionately  are  found  in 
secondary schools where their average prior attainment is becoming more like 
those of competing schools (sector I; index I). 
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Figure 6. Showing the change in the dissimilarity score (d2008 - d2003) for schools 




















Proportion of pupils eligible for free school meals 
(FSM)  149  77  76  95 
Proportion of pupils for whom English is second 
language  112  99  96  87 
Proportion of pupils with a certified statement of 
special educational needs (SEN)  128  90  75  115 
Proportion of pupils White  93  98  96  124 
Proportion of pupils Black Caribbean  120  78  103  79 
Proportion of pupils Black African  112  84  104  86 
Proportion of pupils Indian  77  172  102  84 
Proportion of pupils Pakistani  94  104  112  85 
Proportion of pupils Bangladeshi  109  183  87  47 
Proportion of pupils Chinese  84  70  195  30 
Voluntary aided (CoE) school  30  54  414  48 
Voluntary aided (RC) school  85  120  131  60 
Voluntary controlled school  0  0  -  0 
Other faith school  89  139  166  0 
Selective school  0  174  662  0 
Smaller school  130  35  121  76 
Table 6. Indices indicating the characteristics of pupils and of schools in each of 
the sectors I to IV, respectively, in Figure 6, relative to the other sectors. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
This paper has used methods of spatial analysis including a spatially lagged 
regression  model  to  consider  whether  higher  prior  attaining  pupils  separate 
from  lower  attaining  ones  in  schools  they  choose  or  are  allocated  to  in  the 
transition from primary to secondary school. The empirical evidence suggests   24 
they do, and significantly so, and this is true for every year from 2003 to 2008 
with one unusual exception (in 2008, when selective and voluntary-aided faith 
schools are omitted from the data). What is more, the amount of separation is 
most  likely  an  under-estimate.  Pupils  who  attend  a  fee-charging  secondary 
school are omitted from the analysis (about 14 per cent of pupils on average in 
London  but  over  40  per  cent  for  the  borough  of  Kensington  and  Chelsea; 
MacLeod, 2007), as are pupils who attend a primary school in London but then 
move outside the region to an adjoining county. Omitted to, are pupils with very 
low standardised test scores. 
Despite this, and despite the evident significance of significant sorting by 
prior attainment in the local markets within which secondary schools compete, 
there is not any evidence that the degree of separation is either increasing or 
worsening.  Indeed,  there  is  evidence  of  regression  to  the  mean:  that  schools 
recruiting  higher  or  lower  attaining  pupils  in  2003  become  more  similar  to 
competing schools by 2008. 
 As such, this paper lends support to the findings of others authors, especially 
Gibbons & Telhaj (2007), and also Gorard et al. (2003), and Croxford & Paterson 
(2006) who also show no evidence that the alleged marketisation of education 
(Gewirtz,  Ball,  and  Bowe  1995)  and  the  promotion  of  choice  is  exacerbating 
social (or ethnic) “segregation” between schools. Of course, London may not be 
representative of other parts of England. Nevertheless, combined, the 33 LEAs of 
Greater London school more pupils than any other conurbation in the country. 
Yet, there remain other important questions to consider. Why is it that the 
significant separations of higher and lower attaining pupils (and of FSM eligible   25 
pupils from non-eligible ones in other authors’ work) persist at all? Why are they 
so enduring? 
Two suggestions are proffered here. First is the trend of a rising mean test 
score and a decreasing standard deviation year-by-year from 2003 to 2008. This 
is evident in Table 1 and means it becomes increasingly difficult for any one 
secondary school to recruit the best prior attaining students because students 
are becoming increasingly similar. Yet this does not explain why the differences 
are being maintained not decreased. 
A more compelling reason is the one alluded to when discussing the patterns 
of transition in London and the markets in which schools compete. They are 
geographical.  What  is  more,  they  will  remain  geographical  for  so  long  as 
admissions criteria for popular schools employ geographical criteria, for so long 
as ease of access is important for school choice, and for so long as people value 
the community role of schools. If, in the final analysis, what most parents want is 
access to a good local school where their children will be valued, respected and 
well educated, then we ought not to be surprised if recent educational reforms 
have  done  little  to  increase  or  decrease  social  segregation.  Put  simply,  the 
geographical determinants of separation are stronger. 
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